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Abstract 
Chronic conditions place a high cost burden on the 
healthcare system and deplete the quality of life for 
millions of Americans. There is significant medical 
literature that shows that continuous monitoring of 
patient health at home with the addition of provider 
support, improves patient health. Digital innovations 
such as mHealth technology can be used to provide 
efficient, effective, and patient centered healthcare. 
However, implementing mHealth technology can 
significantly change the composition of clinical staff 
and patient flow. In this paper, we evaluate the trade-
offs of implementing mHealth technology in a clinical 
practice. 
 
1. Introduction 
In the United States today, about half of all adults 
have one or more chronic health conditions. Seven of 
the top ten causes of death in 2014 were chronic 
diseases [1]. Chronic disease and the delivery of care 
to manage and treat these conditions may be the most 
important issue facing our society today [2,3,4,5].  
Mobile health (mHealth) is a broad term typically 
used to describe the use of mobile technologies for the 
delivery of health care. mHealth could help manage 
chronic conditions such as hypertension and diabetes. 
Unlike acute care, chronic healthcare is specially 
characterized by recursive physician-patient 
interactions. Mobile technologies can help improve 
the efficiencies in physician-patient interactions. 
Instead of infrequent patient visits to the provider’s 
office, patients can measure biometric information 
(such as blood pressure and blood sugar levels) at 
home and upload through a smartphone application 
(see, for example, [6]) to a provider’s web-based 
clinical decision support system. Providers can 
remotely monitor patient health and can intervene 
when necessary. This enables greater patient 
engagement in the care delivery process and prompt 
diagnosis and treatment of chronic conditions.  As a 
result, the number of unnecessary visits to physicians’ 
offices and emergency departments can be 
substantially decreased, reducing health care costs.  
Telemedicine has the potential to increase provider 
efficiency [7] and mHealth may become an integral 
part of the care delivery process. Mobile technologies 
create the ability to improve patient health and to 
minimize or even eliminate the need for office visits 
for the routine management of some of the most 
common chronic issues [8]. Agnihothri et al. quantify 
using a Markov model the benefits of mHealth 
interventions [9]. 
Unlike acute conditions, many of the most 
common chronic conditions can be directly attributed 
to specific patient behaviors. Patient behavior can be 
composed of first, adherence to the treatment plan, and 
second, implementation of lifestyle changes that are 
either preventative or aid in management of the 
chronic condition such as diet and exercise. Thus, 
patient education is an important part of patient care. 
Such tasks could be assigned to physician’s support 
staff such as nurse practitioners, dieticians, and 
exercise physiologists. By eliminating physicians’ 
unneeded involvement clinicians might be able to 
spend more time with the patients who need them 
most. 
Thus, adopting mHealth in a clinical practice can 
significantly change the composition of physician staff 
and patient flow. This in turn can change the 
economics associated with care delivery process 
[8,10]. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the 
impact of implementing mHealth technology on a 
clinical practice. Specifically, we investigate “when is 
it economical to switch to an mHealth-based practice 
from a face-to-face, office visit-based clinical 
practice?”  
 
2. Modeling Details 
 
2.1 Regular Clinic or Office mode of care 
 
Before the introduction of mHealth assume a single 
doctor operating a clinic. She receives payment based 
on fee for service. Let the reimbursement be given by 
p for every office visit. In addition to this 
reimbursement, as a token of serving her patient’s 
needs, we assume the doctor receives a share of the 
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patient utility for every patient he serves. This might 
be a notional feel-good effect of making a patient 
healthier and better and is therefore independent of 
number of visits. We assume a linear gain in utility and 
let the utility per patient be given by 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 . (List of 
notations is provided in Table 1) 
We assume the clinic serves different kinds of 
patients and the total patient panel size is N. For 
simplicity we will classify patients into high-risk and 
low-risk patients with arrival rates λ𝐻𝐻  and λ𝐿𝐿  
respectively. These arrivals are over and above the 
regular periodic visits that the patients are expected to 
see the doctor for. Let h denote the proportion of high-
risk patients in a panel size of N. The high-risk patients 
have a higher arrival rate (frequent measure of vitals, 
etc.), that is λ𝐻𝐻 > λ𝐿𝐿 . In our initial analysis, we do not 
assume a priority system in place for clinic operations. 
Hence the clinic sees a combined arrival rate and the 
case-mix does not actually play a role. 
 
Table 1: List of Notations: 
Reimbursement Model 
𝑁𝑁 = Panel size 
𝑝𝑝 = the reimbursement for every office visit 
µ = the physician service rate 
𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = the utility per patient (the doctor receives a 
share of the utility for every patient he serves) 
c = reputation cost of making a patient wait in the 
system for one unit of time 
𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜, 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚= Total average arrival rate for a panel size N 
for regular mode and mHealth mode 
n = Expected arrival rate per patient 
h = the proportion of high-risk patients in a panel 
size of N 
λ𝐻𝐻  = arrival rate of high-risk patients  
λ𝐿𝐿  = arrival rate of low-risk patients (λ𝐻𝐻  > λ𝐿𝐿)  
T = Maximum Average delay to get an appointment 
 
Capitation Model 
pc = capitation payment per patient per period 
m = number of clinical staff  
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 = payroll cost per period per staff  
k1µ = new physician service rate 
𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠= service rate of clinic staff  
k2𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 = the total arrival rate (referral rate) to the 
doctor  
 
Let the total average arrival rate for a panel size of 
N and a case-mix ratio h be given by 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 = λ𝐻𝐻 + λ𝐿𝐿 . 
Since the arrival rate will be a function of the panel 
size, we have 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜(𝑁𝑁) = λ(ℎ𝑁𝑁) + λ�(1 − ℎ)𝑁𝑁�. 
Patients incur a disutility (cost) of traveling to the 
clinic (monetary or otherwise) for every visit and the 
corresponding share for the doctor can be combined 
with any marginal cost for the clinic per visit. We can 
then normalize the combined cost to zero. We assume 
that the clinic is expected to provide an appointment to 
patients within T days on average. Based on the 
expected standard time for a clinic visit and a 
dedicated time for non-periodic visits, let the service 
rate be given by µ. (Note: This implicitly means that 
the service rate µ is determined exogenously. The 
randomness comes from variation in day to day clinic 
operations.) 
The doctor decides on an optimal panel size such 
that the net revenue for the specialist is maximized. 
The net revenue per period for the doctor is then given 
by  
𝜋𝜋(N, 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜) = 𝑝𝑝 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢𝑁𝑁 −  𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇 −  𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜  𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. 1
𝜇𝜇 −  𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 ≤ 𝑇𝑇 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 
𝜇𝜇 >  𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 
 
Note that we do not consider the revenue from 
regular visits in the net revenue function. In 
expectation terms, this is a fixed amount per period 
and hence will not change the result of the 
optimization problem. The term 𝑐𝑐
𝜇𝜇− 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 can be seen as 
the cost of reputation if the clinic is very congested 
with severe appointment delays. We note that the 
optimal solution will be the same even if we consider 
only the waiting time (in contrast to the total time) 
since the service rate is fixed.  
If we assume 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 to simply be a factor of N (rather 
than a function of N), that is, each patient is expected 
to see the doctor n times a year (over and above the 
periodic “maintenance” visits), we can simplify the net 
revenue function further and identify the optimal panel 
size. If we assume 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 = 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁, then the solution to the 
optimization problem is as follows.  
Proposition 1: Let 𝑁𝑁∗ denote the optimal panel size. If 
𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 < 𝑐𝑐(1+𝜇𝜇)2𝜇𝜇3 , then 𝑁𝑁∗ = 0. If 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 ≥
𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐 𝑇𝑇2𝜇𝜇, then 𝑁𝑁∗ = 𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛
−
1
𝑇𝑇 𝑛𝑛. Otherwise, 𝑁𝑁∗ = 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 −
�
𝑐𝑐𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛 (𝑛𝑛 𝑝𝑝+ 𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢). 
 
The proof follows from concavity of the objective 
function and first order conditions. The details are 
given in the appendix. The first condition ensures that 
the participation constraint for the provider is satisfied. 
The second part of the proposition pertains to the case 
when the service level constraint is binding.  
 
2.2 Clinic operations with mHealth 
 
In this section we explore if and when the doctor 
would adopt mHealth. We use the optimal panel size 
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that is in effect before the introduction of mHealth. 
Given this panel size we optimize the clinic operations 
(that is, staff level). We then compare the two net 
revenues in both the modes of care and derive 
conditions under which mHealth mode is beneficial 
for the clinic. We identify the range of parameter 
values where it is optimal to introduce mHealth. Later 
on we also investigate how the optimal panel size will 
change with the introduction of mHealth. 
Since there are currently limitations with respect to 
reimbursement for mHealth visits, we explore a 
capitation-based model in which the doctor gets 
reimbursed every period for each patient in her panel 
size. To start with we will assume there are bonuses 
and/or penalties based on patient health and the 
payment is conditional on some minimum 
expectations. We will assume that the doctor satisfies 
these minimum expectations to obtain the capitation 
payment 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 . In the base model we do not identify the 
optimal penalties and bonuses. We assume them to be 
exogenous and fixed. This will help us focus on the 
optimal operation of the clinic for a panel size 
identified before mHealth adoption. 
In order to manage the operations, the doctor 
employs a few clinical staff. These clinical staff play 
an active disease management role and they are not 
simply administrators managing appointments. Their 
roles could be providing ancillary services (e.g., 
dieticians), monitoring vitals, etc. Let the payroll cost 
per period per staff be given by of 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 and the number 
of clinical staff be denoted by m.  
We also assume sequential mode of care where all 
patients are first monitored by clinical staff. On a need 
basis the clinical staff ask the patients to schedule an 
appointment with the doctor or put a referral. (Note: 
Alternatively, if there is an efficient routing system in 
place that automatically routes arrivals to the 
appropriate server, the care delivery could be done in 
parallel instead of sequential.) The mHealth mode of 
care delivery may potentially increase the efficiency 
of the doctor since most of the medical service will be 
provided by her staff and her role will be more of a 
supervisory role. On the other hand, the doctor may 
now only deal with sicker and complicated patients 
after getting triaged by her staff. Dealing with these 
patients may be difficult and consume more time. We 
let the new service rate for clinic visits be k1µ, where 
𝑘𝑘1 <> 1. Let the service rate of clinic staff be given 
by 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠.  
Even though the arrival rate to the clinic will vary 
according to the patient-type, case-mix ratio h, and 
patient panel size N, the arrival rate to the doctor will 
be lower, as much of the treatment can be managed by 
the clinic staff. Let the total arrival rate (referral rate) 
to the doctor be given by k2 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚, where 𝑘𝑘2 < 1. 
Given the capitation model and a fixed panel size, 
since payments are fixed, it is enough if we focus on 
the cost per period of clinic operations for 
optimization. However, for the sake of consistency, 
we work with the net revenue as given by  
 
𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚(N, 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚) = 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁 −  𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘1𝜇𝜇 −  𝑘𝑘2𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 𝑘𝑘2𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚
− 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚) 
 
where 𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚) has a similar connotation to 
𝑐𝑐
𝜇𝜇− 𝜆𝜆𝑜𝑜 and represents the congestion cost related to the 
clinic staff. We use the following approximation for 
the waiting time in queue 
𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚, 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚) = 𝜌𝜌�2(𝑚𝑚+1)𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝜌𝜌) 
where 𝜌𝜌 = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠  [11]. 
In this case the doctor needs to pick the optimal 
staff size m. The clinic will then solve the following 
optimization problem, assuming 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚 = 𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁. 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀m 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚(N, 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚(𝑁𝑁),𝑚𝑚) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.𝑊𝑊(𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚(N), 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚) ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 , 
𝑚𝑚 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 >  𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚(N) 
 
Again, we assume that the staff are expected to 
provide a response (intervention) to patients within 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 
days on average. The stability constraints and the 
service level constraints for the provider are not 
included in the optimization problem since they are 
not dependent on the staff size m. However, they are 
very much relevant and are assumed to be satisfied by 
the parameter values in the optimization problem. 
Specifically, the optimization problem is only valid if 
1
𝑘𝑘1𝜇𝜇− 𝑘𝑘2𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚(N) ≤ 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 and 𝑘𝑘1𝜇𝜇 >  𝑘𝑘2λ(N).  
 
3. Numerical analysis   
 
3.1 Choice of parameters in the base case 
 
Consider the period to be a day. Two visits is the 
average number of additional visits to the clinic per 
patient per year. Assuming the doctor spends about 20 
minutes with each patient and is available for 7 hours 
a day and the doctor allocates 20% of his time to 
urgent or non-periodic visits, service rate is then 𝜇𝜇 =4.2 patients per day. We will assume twice the regular 
rate for the clinical staff on average. 𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠 = 42 patients 
per day. Assume payroll cost, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝, to be 200 dollars per 
day per staff (based on an annual salary of 73,000 
dollars). We assume 𝑝𝑝 = $50 per visit, 𝑎𝑎 = 2/365, 
that is, two non-regular visits per patient per year, 
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𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢 = 1 per patient per day, 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = $2 per patient per 
day, 𝑘𝑘1 = 1, 𝑘𝑘2 = 0.02, 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 5 per day, 𝑇𝑇 = 5 
days, and 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚 = 1 day,𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 1/7, that is, mobile apps 
are used at least once a week by patients. Since  𝑘𝑘2 =0.02, only 2% of these mobile uploads are referred to 
the doctor. 
 
3.2 Pre-mHealth case 
 
For the base case the optimal panel size is found to 
be 711 and the total net revenue is 842 per day. We 
next explore how sensitive the optimal panel size is 
with respect to the service level requirement T in 
Figure 1. We observe that even though the service 
level constraint is relaxed (higher T), the optimal panel 
size only increases marginally (for 𝑇𝑇 > 4). This is due 
to the importance the provider gives for her reputation 
determined by the congestion in her clinic. The 
behavior of the net revenue is similar. 
 
 
Figure 1: Optimal Panel Size vs. Maximum 
Average Delay for Appointment 
 
3.3 mHealth case 
 
For the base case scenario, the optimal staff size for 
mHealth mode is 2.7 and the net revenue is 844 per 
day. The optimal m is also linearly increasing with n𝑚𝑚. 
We next analyze scenarios or parameter values where 
the mHealth mode generates more net revenue than the 
regular office mode. 
Figure 2 shows the difference in net revenue for 
different values of the average number of uploads per 
patient. We can observe a cut-off value beyond which 
mHealth mode fares worse than the regular mode. For 
the base case in Figure 2 we observe that the cut-off 
value is just above once a week. While the benefit of 
mHealth comes from the clinical support staff 
managing most of the care, unexpectedly, mHealth 
could also make patients seek care more often as the 
access to health providers becomes easier. If so, then 
mHealth could potentially increase the load on the 
clinic, requiring additional staff capacity and hence the 
net revenue might be lower than that of regular mode. 
Clinics should be wary of such patient behavior during 
the transition phase. 
Figure 3 shows the difference in net revenue for 
different values of the average service rate of clinical 
staff. The difference in revenue increases with the 
efficiency of care delivery. Due to the continuous 
nature of treatment plan, care delivery through 
mHealth can become efficient and can become patient-
centric. With patient-specific data to guide treatment 
plans, efficiency in care delivery could lead to higher 
revenue in the case of mHealth. In the base case the 
service rate of clinic staff is at twice the regular rate of 
the doctor. While this rate is enough to lead to a higher 
profit, we also note that further efficiency increase has 
decreasing returns on the profit. 
 
 
Figure 2: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs. 
Average Number of Uploads per patient 
 
 
Figure 3: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs. 
Average Service Rate of Clinic Staff 
 
Figure 4 shows the difference in net revenue for 
different values of the capitation fee per patient. We 
can observe a cut-off value only beyond which 
mHealth mode fares better than the regular mode. This 
reinforces the key reason why doctors hesitate to 
venture into mHealth. Even under capitation-based 
models, if the reimbursement provided to the doctors 
are insufficient, the incentive to adopt mHealth 
reduces and the providers would prefer the regular 
mode of care and a fee-for-service regime. Policy 
makers need to structure the payments carefully to 
provide proper incentives for mHealth. 
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Figure 4: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs. 
Capitation payment per patient 
 
Figure 5 shows the difference in net revenue for 
different values of the average service rate of the 
doctor. We can observe a cut-off value beyond which 
mHealth mode becomes feasible and fares better than 
the regular mode. As the service rate increases, the 
optimal panel size also increases and hence the impact 
of mHealth increases as well. Similar to our discussion 
under clinic staff, the availability of regular patient-
specific data in the mHealth mode can make care 
delivery pertinent and efficient. Patients taking control 
of their health also play a role in increasing the 
efficiency of the provider.  
 
 
Figure 5: Difference in Total Net Revenue vs. 
Average Service Rate of Provider 
 
We also analyze how the clinic can choose the 
optimal panel size in the case of mHealth mode. 
Finally, we also investigate the differential impact of 
case-mix on the mHealth mode operations. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Continuous care management has been strongly 
recommended to decrease the costs associated with 
chronic care. Healthcare technology including mobile 
technology can greatly aid in this regard. They can also 
help in patient-specific care management. In this 
research we show the conditions under which clinics 
can adopt mHealth. 
While mHealth has shown a lot of promise in 
patient data collection and giving patient more control, 
one must also consider the role of providers in the 
adoption of mHealth. It adds significant burden to the 
specialists and without proper reimbursement 
initiatives the benefits of mHealth may not be fully 
realized. Our analysis brings out the benefits for 
providers using mHealth. In addition to identifying the 
key parameters that will influence the adoption of 
mHealth, our analysis helps in exploring the trade‐offs 
for providers (clinics or physicians) in offering 
mHealth to its patients. We explore if the government 
and private insurance companies should play a role for 
mHealth to be successful and whether such moves will 
increase social welfare.  
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7. Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: The objective function is 
concave in N since  
𝑎𝑎2𝜋𝜋
𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁2
= − 2𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎3𝑁𝑁(𝜇𝜇 − 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁)3 − 2𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎2(𝜇𝜇 − 𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁)2 < 0 
Therefore, we can use the first-order conditions to 
identify the optimal N. The first-order condition yields 
two roots: �𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛
−
�𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛2(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢) , 𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛 + �𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)𝜇𝜇𝑛𝑛2(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢) �. Since 
𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛
+ �𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛3(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)𝜇𝜇
𝑛𝑛2(𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑢)  is infeasible (the second constraint 
which refers to system stability is not satisfied), only 
the other root is possible. Only the boundary 
conditions need to be checked namely, the service 
constraint and the non-negative objective function. 
The proposition then follows.  
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